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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to respond to Thomas Diez‘s call for more reflexivity in the notion 
of  EU  normative  power.  The  case  study  concerns  how  the  EU  defines  its  role  in  its 
relationship with Ukraine: Is it shaped by value considerations, namely by the normative 
ideal of democracy promotion? Or do self-interests prevail in the framing of EU decisions? 
Historical analysis, in-depth interviews as well as discourse analysis reveal that the EU‘s 
rhetoric on the value of democracy is often contradicted by the predominance of EU‘s self-
interests. Moreover, the EU‘s attempt to disguise its strategic goals by making broad, vague 
and declarative statements leads to the conclusion that the EU resembles more and more the 
―Machiavellian prince‖ who has to present a lofty image of himself and of his ventures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   4 
1. Introduction 
The attempts to capture the nature of ‗this strange political animal‘ that is the European 
Union have been abundant. One of the most original and most successful interpretations of 
EU power was the elaboration of the normative power concept. This approach, which is 
noted for the importance that it attributes to the ideational dimension of EU external political 
action, is being increasingly and legitimately challenged by those who advocate that the EU 
is not the benign, virtuous and altruistic power as it is usually considered to be.  Thomas 
Diez is a leading exponent of these academic rebels who demystify the normative power 
concept and call for more reflexivity in the notion of EU normative power.   
Indeed, the elements of strategic, self-interested political action have been for a long 
time  overshadowed  by  the  EU‘s  historical  success  of  promoting  democracy  through 
enlargement in Central  and Eastern Europe, as  well as by its self-defined strategies that 
embraced the means of rhetoric and declarative politics. A more reflexive approach that goes 
beyond the general assumptions of benevolent EU goals is thus required.  
The  case  study  of  EU-Ukraine  relations  analyses  if  EU  political  action  vis-à-vis 
Ukraine is shaped by value considerations (namely the ideal of democracy) as the normative 
power approach would predict, or whether self-interests (geopolitical, economic or security) 
prevail in the framing of EU political choices. The Ukrainian case is relevant for several 
reasons.  First  of  all,  Ukraine  is  often  defined  as  a  ‗second  Turkey‘  because  of  its  high 
expectations to join the EU and because of the EU‘s reluctance to meet these expectations. 
After the almost certain accession of the Western Balkans, Ukraine is to become the ‗test 
country‘ of the EU‘s enlargement prospects in its Eastern neighbourhood and of the scope 
and future of EU enlargement policy in general. Secondly, Ukraine‘s democracy, although 
fragile and often unpredictable, has made significant progress in the last ten years, and the   5 
way it develops depends also on the EU‘s will and capability to influence it. Hence, this case 
is also a good test of the EU‘s democracy promotion strategy. Last but not least, Ukraine‘s 
recent  foreign  policy  choices  indicate  the  shifting  nature  of  EU-Ukraine  relations.  The 
analysis of the historical grounds and dynamics of these relations could be a useful tool to 
understand better EU foreign policy in a former Soviet geopolitical area and its prospects.          
The theoretical framework of this research is based on Realpolitik and Normative 
Power  approaches,  which  are  further  crystallized  in  the  ideal-types  of  value-laden  and 
interest-laden  political  action.  The    research  is  divided  into  three  parts:  the  historical 
analysis, which aims at detecting the nature of the considerations that shaped EU foreign 
policy  towards  Ukraine  in  the  1990‘s  and  during  the  Orange  Revolution;  the  in-depth 
interviews  that  follow  the  political  anthropology  method  to  uncover  the  underlying 
motivations and reasons for EU strategic choices as regards to Ukraine; and a discourse and 
content  analysis  of  the  New  Neighbourhood  Policy  to  interpret  if  the  EU‘s  rhetoric  on 
democracy is reflected in its actual promotion of democratic values. 
.  
2. Realpolitik and Normative Power:  Interest-laden and Value-laden Actions 
The two constitutive components of any political action are goals and means, which 
are also the crucial elements to determine the nature of the political actor itself. Realpolitik 
and normative power approaches differ significantly in their interpretation of both; goals and 
means thus represent two diametrically opposed models of political action. 
Realpolitik, often identified with Otto von Bismarck, is the broadest expression of 
political realism. However, the notion of power politics can be dated to ancient Greece, in   6 
which  classical  realism  arose  as  a  political  thought  under  Thucydides  and  Aristotle
1. 
Realism, as many authors have emphasized, is not a single theory but rather a ―philosophical 
orientation of thought‖
2. 
 Kissinger defines Realpolitik as ―foreign policy based on calculations of power and 
the  national  interest‖
3  (emphasis  added).  Indeed,  the  concept  of  power  is  central  to  all 
variants of realism and is understood primarily in terms of political power in which the logic 
of conflict and struggle prevail. In addition to power, the second element that is peculiar to 
Realpolitik is the prevalence of self-interest. Even though Morgenthau recognizes that ―the 
kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the 
political  and  cultural  context  within  which  foreign  policy  is  formulated‖
4,  he  also 
emphasizes that there is an immutable element of national interest, that of national security. 
In fact, all realists share the belief that international relations are guided by the instinct of 
self-preservation as well as by the egoism and self-interest that are inherent in human nature. 
This pessimistic vision of mankind is central to Hobbes‘ thought, who describes the natural 
human condition as a ―war of every man against every man‖
5. The only remedy to this 
natural  state  of  crude  war  is  to  create,  through  a  common  pact  between  individuals,  a 
sovereign state which possesses authority over the individuals. However, this kind of cure is 
not possible on the level of international or inter-state politics, where no supreme guardian 
exists and, consequently, the resulting condition is one of permanent anarchy. In this context 
of constant threats, conflicts and competition, relations among the states are always about 
security and survival. Therefore while the pursuit of power for realists is always an ultimate 
                                                 
1  Robert  Jackson  &  Georg  Sorensen,  Introduction  to  International  Relations:  Theories  and  Approaches, 
Oxford, OUP, 2003 2
nd ed., pp. 68-69.  
2 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 6. 
3Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Touchstone, 1994, p. 137. 
4  Hans  Joachim  Moregnthau,  Politics  among  Nations:  Struggle  for  Power  and  Peace,  New  York, 
McGrawHill/Irvin, 2006, p. 11. 
5 Hobbes, cited in Jack Donnelly, ‗Realism‘, in Scott Burchill et al.(eds.), Theories of International Relations, 
Houndmills, Palgrave, 2005, 3
rd ed., p. 33.   7 
goal, the primary and basic interest is rather one of self-conservation as a ―physical, political 
and cultural entity‖
6.   
Geopolitics is another central element in power considerations. Probably the most 
prominent realist who wrote on geopolitics is Machiavelli. Even though he never used the 
term ‗geopolitics‘, it was Machiavelli who elaborated the very notion of geopolitics.  As 
Machiavelli reminds us, the prince must deploy two instruments: power (he must be the 
Lion) and the art of deception (he also needs to be the Fox)
7. Machiavelli recognized the 
importance of image-creating  and  the  politics  of  ‗appearance‘:  ―Nessuna  cosa  fa  tanto 
stimare un principe, quanto fanno le grande imprese e dare di se‘ rari esempli‖
8 (―Nothing 
creates  more  esteem  for  a  prince  than  to  undertake  great  ventures  and  to  provide  an 
exceptional  image  of  himself‖).  Machiavelli  insisted  that  the  prince  must  give  the 
appearance of virtue.  
We can assume consequently that in the Realpolitik model the ultimate goal of a 
political  community  is  the  pursuit  of  political  power,  while  the  immediate  goal  is  self-
preservation and security. These goals are egoistic in nature, and the actions that follow are 
self-interested. The means employed to achieve these political goals are power and ruse. We 
therefore can describe Realpolitik as the pursuit of power through power.  
A pursuit of norms through norms, on the contrary, is the essence of the normative 
power concept. The goals of a normative power are of an anthropologically different nature 
because they are not about power or self-interest but rather values, norms and ideals. The 
actions that result are of a soft, civilian and cooperative nature. The famous definition of 
Robert Kagan is the best expression of this contraposition:  ―Americans are from Mars, 
                                                 
6 Burchill, op. cit., p. 37. 
7 Machiavelli, Il Principe, Firenze, Giunti Editore, 2004. 
8 Ibid., p. 178.   8 
Europeans from Venus‖
9. In the scientific literature it was labelled as a soft power and later 
as a normative power. The soft power concept was formulated by Joseph S. Nye, who noted 
―soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than 
coerces  them‖
10.    The  central  mechanism  underlying  soft  power  is  thus  the  ability  to 
convince and persuade through attraction. However, soft power is a descriptive tool which 
says nothing about policy goals (which can be for ―good or bad purposes‖
11). As Nye admits, 
―while soft power can be used with bad intentions and wreak horrible consequences, it does 
differ in terms of means‖
12.  
Ian  Manners  affirms  that  the  concepts  of  normative  and  civilian  power  are  very 
closely related but insists on an ideational dimension to normative power. 
13 In contrast, the 
soft power concept concentrates on capabilities and the use of civilian instruments in foreign 
policy rather than on ideational aspec ts
14. The absence of an ideational or prescriptive 
dimension, the emphasis on means, and the silence on the goals of foreign policy are the 
main differences between the concepts of soft power and normative power. The ideational 
dimension of goals is indeed  central in the normative power approach, which  Richard 
Youngs describes as a ―general flavor of the pre-eminence of ideational focus‖
15. In the 
words  of  Thomas  Diez  and  Ian  Manners,  normative  power  is  ―based  on  ideas  and 
conscience‖
16 and ―it is not a foreign policy tool to be wielded for national interests‖
17. This 
                                                 
9 Robert Kagan. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York, Knopf, 
2003. 
10 Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York, Basic Books, 1990 (2
nd 
chapter), in Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 
2004, p. 5.   
11 Joseph S. Nye, ‗Notes on a Soft-Power Research Agenda‘, in Felix Berenskoetter & Michael J. Williams 
(eds.), Power in World Politics, London, Routledge, 2007, p. 169. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ian Manners, ‗Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?‘, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
vol. 40.  No. 2, 2002,  pp. 235-258. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Richard Youngs, ‗Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU‘s External Identity‘, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 42, no. 2, 2004, p. 419. 
16 Thomas Diaz & Ian Manners,  ‗Reflecting on Normative Power Europe‘, in Felix Berenskoetter & Michael J. 
Williams (eds.), Power in World Politics, London, Routledge, 2007, p. 175 
17 Ibid., p. 179   9 
statement presumes that foreign policy action, in the spirit of Weber‘s ideal types, is to be a 
purely value-laden action. And on an analytical level this value-laden action is opposed to 
self-interested actions that characterize the Realpolitik approach to foreign policy
18.   
The adoption of Max Weber‘s method of ideal types
19 serves as an analytical and 
conceptual tool for empirical analysis. The conceptual abstraction of ideal types does not 
signify that these types of action can be found in their pure form in reality. As Weber notes, 
in practice we will never find the existence of pure ideal-types, but we will discover a mix of 
ideal types. This is also true for our ideal types of value-laden and self-interested political 
action, because it is difficult to separate interests from norms as they are often intertwined
20. 
Interests can contain a normative dimension and can represent a certain value in itself ( in 
Realpolitik, for example, the security of one‘s own political community is a normative value 
but at the same time it is also the primary interest), as well as values themselves can become 
an interest
21. However, analytically they can and they should be separated for the above 
reasons.  
The last clarification is about the basic assumption of this research: the EU is 
assumed to be a unitary political actor in its foreign policy, and thus the focus of this study is 
the political goals
22 of the EU in its relations with Ukraine. The existence of differenc es in 
interests does not prevent the existence of conformity on some aspects of ―crucial interests in 
                                                 
18  Nathalie  Tocci  (ed.),  Who  is  a  Normative  Foreign  Policy  Actor?  The  European  Union  and  its  Global 
Partners, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008, pp. 5-6. 
19 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. 
20 Michael Cox, ‗The Empire‘s Back in Town: or America‘s Imperial Temptation – Again‘, Millenium, vol. 10, 
no. 2, 2003, p. 9,  cited in Thomas Diaz & Ian Manners, ‗Reflecting on Normative Power Europe‘, in Felix 
Berenskoetter & Michael J. Williams (eds.), Power in World Politics, London, Routledge, 2007,  p. 181. 
21 Richard Youngs, op. cit., p. 421. 
22 The analysis of the means of the political action is not needed, as it is widely known that the EU in its 
relation with Ukraine relies exclusively on soft power.   10 
common‖
23. The investigation of these common interests and goals and their projection into 
external relations with Ukraine is the main purpose of this research.  
 
3. EU-Ukraine: The Story of Lost Opportunities 
Are  the  EU‘s  goals  in  its  relations  with  Ukraine  defined  in  terms  of  value 
considerations  or are they  rather interest-laden  political  actions?  In order to  answer this 
question an analysis of two historical periods of EU-Ukraine relations that are divided by the 
watershed Orange Revolution was conducted. In both periods, the EU lost the opportunity to 
influence  the  democratization  process  in  Ukraine,  and  the  underlying  reasons  for  EU 
reluctance to act as a normative power towards Ukraine are considered.  
According to Leonardo Morlino, the democratization process can be divided into the 
transition,  establishment  and  consolidation  processes
24. The democratization process is , 
however, an open process in that it is reversible: it can stagnate as well enter into crisis. One 
can distinguish between two types of crisis: the crisis within the democracy and the crisis of 
the democracy. If the former is characteristic of  an unstable democracy, the latter usually 
leads  to  the  breakdown  of  democracy.  The  Orange  Revolution  in  this  sense  was  an 
exceptional case: although it was a crisis of democracy, instead of leading to the collapse of 
democracy  it  resulted  in  a  ‗democratizing  moment‘.  Furthermore,  the  democratization 
process is ―the result of the interaction of internal and external factors‖
25 and so the recurrent 
crises in the post-Orange Revolution Ukrainian democracy and the resulting instability of 
democratic  rule  were  dependent  on  the  weakness  of  both  internal  as  well  as  external 
                                                 
23 Rousseau, cited in  Scott Burchill, The  National Interest  in International Relations Theory, Houndmills, 
Palgrave, 2005, p. 27. 
24 Leonardo Morlino, Democrazie e democratizzazioni, Bologna, il Mulino, 2003. 
25 Elena Baracani, ‗The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Strategy of Democratization on the 
Framework  of  the  Neighbourhood  Policy?‘,  retrieved  22  April  2010,  p.  4, 
http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/baracani.pdf   11 
democratizing factors.  The weakness of the EU as an external democratizing factor was 
evident in both the first democratic attempt of Ukraine as well as in the second one.  
In post-communist Ukraine a formal democracy was established, but the political 
system was rather similar to ―competitive authoritarianism‖, especially under the period of 
Leonid  Kuchma‘s  political  dominance  (1994-2004)
26.  Even  though  the  constitution 
established a semi-presidential form of the government, in reality ―power – both formal and 
informal – became concentrated in the hands of the president‖
27. The formal separation of 
powers was blurred and the judicial system was almost entirely dependent on the president 
through the Ministry of Justice. The creation of new democratic institutions did not lead to a 
democratic  government.  The  former  communist  nomenklatura  maintained  its  power  and 
undertook only partial reforms. The privatization process was conducted in a way that a few 
powerful oligarchs obtained the most important economic assets, and the collision between 
politics and business resulted in what Vaclav Havel called a ―mix of authoritarian regime 
and mafia capitalism‖
28. The powerful oligarchs were linked to Kuchma‘s inner circle and 
became loyal supporters of his rule.  The opposition forces were harassed and some dramatic 
events,  such  as  the  murder  of  journalist  Georgy  Gongadze,  revealed  the  president‘s 
involvement.  In the context of these internal developments in Ukraine, the European Union 
did  not  have  many  opportunities  to  contribute  to  its  democratization  process,  especially 
because Kuchma‘s ―multi-vector foreign policy‖
29 was rich in rhetoric declarations toward 
both Russia and the EU
30. As a result, it is true that in the first period ―the EU hardly had a 
                                                 
26 Paul Kubicek, ‗Problems of Post-Post-Communism: Ukraine after the Orange Revolution‘, Democratization, 
vol. 16, no. 2, 2009, p. 326. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Vaclav Havel, interview with Jacques Rupnik, Le Monde, 24 February 2005. 
29  Linas  Linkevicius,  ‗The  European  Union  Neighbourhood  Policy  towards  Ukraine‘,  Lithuanian  Foreign 
Policy Review, no. 21, 2008, p. 79. 
30 Ukraine is an internally divided country. There are two historic-cultural, linguistic and political identities in 
Ukraine that largely correspond to the  East-West divide. The eastern and southern part  is more pro-Russian, 
while  the  western  part  is  pro-European.  However,  we  should  emphasize  that,  contrary  to  opinion  on 
membership in NATO, most Ukrainians would support Ukraine‘s membership in the EU. Also the opposition 
of Russia, at least formally, prevents accession to NATO but not to the EU.   12 
strong and reliable partner in Ukraine until at least 2002‖
31. However, we should take into 
consideration the fact that from the very beginning the EU ―had two different sets of policies 
towards the two different groups of countries as defined by the EU: the Central and East 
European countries and the Newly Independent States‖
32. This dividing line, as notes Iryna 
Solonenko, is usually taken for granted and the EU ―never explained the grounds on which 
such a division was based‖
33. The author also emphasizes that in this way, ―Ukraine became 
‗locked-into‘ specific policy arrangements on the part of the EU, which largely determined 
the subsequent development of EU policy towards Ukraine and in a way shaped the course 
of Ukraine‘s transformation‖
34. Beyond historical, geographical  and  cultural  reasons,  the 
main factor was, undoubtedly, the geopolitical tension with Russia. The ‗Russia-first policy‘ 
of the EU was evident in the 1990s. The division of the new Europe into spheres of influence 
became in this context an unwritten agreement that resulted in a lost opportunity on the part 
of the EU to have more influence in Ukraine and on its democratization process. This loss 
was irremediable (at least until the emergence of effective internal opposition forces), mainly 
because  the  stabilization  of  Russia-Ukraine  relations  did  not  leave  room  for  the  EU  in 
Ukraine.  As  a  result,  the  ―issue  of  democracy  in  Ukraine…was  not  high  on  the  EU‘s 
agenda‖
35.  This  is  also  demonstrated  by  the  discrepancies  between  EU-Russia  and  EU-
Ukraine relations: the geopolitical considerations induced the EU to prioritize Russia as a 
partner even if the achievements of Russia were far less promising
36.  
                                                 
31  Iryna  Solonenko,  ‗External  Democracy  Promotion  in  Ukraine:  the  Role  of  the  European  Union‘, 
Democratization, vol. 16, no.4, 2009, p. 711. 
32 Ibid., p. 713. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., pp. 713-714. 
35 Iryna Solonenko, ‗The EU Impact on Democratic Transformation in Ukraine‘, in Stephen Velychenko (ed.), 
Ukraine, The EU and Russia, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p.140. 
36 Iryna Solonenko, ‗External Democracy Promotion in Ukraine: the Role of the European Union‘, op. cit., p. 
714.   13 
In this context, EU-Ukraine relations were legally formalized only in 1998
37 in the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). This agreement contained references to 
democracy as the essential element (and common commitment) of the agreement and stated 
that  one  of  the  objectives  of  PCA  is  to  ―support  Ukrainian  efforts  to  consolidate  its 
democracy‖
38.  However,  it  did  not  foresee  any  mechanism  or  practical  tools  (no 
conditionality clause was introduced in EU-Ukraine relations until 2005) and as a result 
remained a political declaration that lacked both a precise vision and concrete instruments.  
The EU, on the contrary, sought for more practical agreements, and the first action plan 
between the EU and Ukraine was in Justice and Home Affairs (2001). This agreement made 
references to democracy and the rule of law to a very limited extent and mainly in light of 
the effective implementation of other priorities such a border management, combating crime, 
migration management and readmission, all of them of clear concern to the EU
39.  
Another window of opportunity to strengthen the democratization process in Ukraine 
was the  Orange Revolution, which  ―symbolizes  both  the  internal  developments  toward 
democracy in Ukraine as well as external implications regarding the choice between a Pro-
Western  and  a  Pro-Russian  orientation  of  the  country‖
40. Ukraine‘s second attempt to 
undertake the democratization process was called by Shewcova, ―a Revolution against the 
imitation  of  democracy‖
41,  while  Gorbachev‘s  expression  was  even  stronger:  ―The  wall 
                                                 
37 Even if the agreement was signed in 1994 but remained unratified. 
38 Article 1. Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the European Communities and their member 
states and Ukraine, in Florent  Parmentier,  ‗The  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  as  a  Democratic  Norms 
Diffusion in Ukraine. Can the EU Act Beyond Conditionality?‘, Cahier Européen, no. 02/2006, Paris, CERI, p. 
7. 
39 Mariella Franz, ‗The Impact of Enlargement on EU Immigration Policy towards the New Neighbouring 
States:  A  Case  Study  on  Ukraine‘,  in  Katarzyna  Kosior  &  Agata  Jurkowska  (eds.),  Beyond  the  Borders: 
Ukraine and the European Neighbourhood Policy, Rzeszow, University of IT and Management, 2007,  p. 144. 
40 C. Normann, ‗Poland‘s Involvement during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine: Between a Mediator and 
Advocate‖, in Katarzyna Kosior & Agata Jurkowska (eds.), Beyond the Borders: Ukraine and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Rzeszow, University of IT and Management, 2007,   p. 164. 
41 L. Shewcowa, ‗Ukraina: Wzgliag iz Rossii‘, International Gerald Tribune, cited in Sofiya Fedyna, ‗Orange 
Revolution as an Active Nonviolence. Ukraine on its Way to Democratization and Civil Society‘, in Katarzyna 
Kosior & Agata Jurkowska (eds.), p. 236.   14 
collapsed  again‖
42.  The  revolution  signalled  Ukraine‘s  determination  to  turn  into  a 
democratic country and also confirmed Ukraine‘s European choice, as ―it was the first time 
that the European project was at the heart of internal and external policy‖
43. Ivan Krastev 
even equated the effects of the Orange Revolution to Russia to those of September 11 in the 
United  States
44.  In  fact,  ―the  strong  expression  of  commitment  to  democracy  and  the 
European choice made by Ukrainians during the Orange Revolution came as a surprise to the 
EU and most outside observers‖
45. 
The parliamentary elections in 2002 marked a real shift in Ukrainian politics: for the 
first time the Communist Party lost its prominent position, while ‗Our Ukraine‘ became the 
first real opposition.  After many years the Ukrainian people were united and gathered in 
their  protest  against  corrupted  governing  political  elite  in  their  fight  for  democracy. 
However, it was not only a political but also a cultural revolution, and, thus a ―revolution for 
ideas, values and principles‖
46.   
The  struggle  for  the  European  values  of  democracy,  human  rights,  rule  of  law 
indicated  clearly  that  not  only  new  Ukrainian  politicians  but  also  the broad  majority  of 
Ukrainian people made their ‗European choice‘. In fact, it is fundamental to notice that ―EU 
accession is perceived as a consolidating factor for Ukrainian society‖
47. And subsequent 
developments showed that this consolidating factor was present on both the societal level as 
well  as  among  political  elites.  The  new  president  made  it  clear  that  the  top  priority  is 
Ukrainian  membership  in  the  EU,  and  he  obtained  the  support  of  the  Block  of  Julia 
                                                 
42 Gorbachev, Radio Liberty, Ukraine, 23 November 2004, cited in Katarzyna Kosior & Agata Jurkowska 
(eds.), p. 239. 
43 Anne De Tinguy, ‗La D￩termination Europ￩enne de l‘Ukraine‘, in Jacque Rupnik (ed.), Les Banlieues de 
l’Europe, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2007, p. 45 
44 Jacque Rupnik, ‗Introduction‘, op. cit., p. 33 
45 Linas Linkevicius, op. cit., p. 65. 
46 O. Podrovna, ‗Ukraine: Internal Political Development and Idea of Integration to the EU‘, in Katarzyna 
Kosior & Agata Jurkowska (eds.), op. cit., p. 241. 
47 Oleksander Derhachov, ‗Ukraine‘s Position on European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Prospects for 
Cooperation  with  the  EU.  ENP  Country  Reports‘,  Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.  International  Policy  Analysis, 
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Tymoshenko  (which  included  the  Social  Democratic  Party),  the  Socialist  Party  (led  by 
Moroz) and other deputies, which shows a wide coalition formed around the new political 
agenda
48.  Moreover,  the  political  dynamics  of  the  subsequent  parliamentary  elections  
confirmed that the ‗EU factor‘ was probably the only one that was shared across all main 
political forces as the ―attitudes of leading political forces and the most influential leaders, 
Viktor  Yushchenko,  Viktor  Yanukovych  and  Julia  Tymoshenko  to[wards]  European 
integration converge[d] in principle‖
49. This observation is of fundamental relevance because 
no democracy is possible without a basic consensus on the ‗rules of the game‘ among the 
competing elites. In this context, an EU accession perspective had enormous potential in 
consolidating the democracy in Ukraine.  
The EU‘s response, however, was far from providing the necessary ‗glue‘ for the 
political consensus in Ukraine, even if it is usually portrayed in a very positive light: ―The 
post-enlargement EU has acted as an efficient mediator
50, with a troika composed of Polish 
President Kwasniewski, Lithuanian President Adamkus and  High-Representative for ESDP 
Javier  Solana‖
51.  Nevertheless,  the  efficiency  in  mediation  does  not  mean  an  adequate 
overall response was given, rather it was limited to ―a delayed resolution condemning the 
falsification of election results after the first round of the elections, [with] no necessity for an 
extraordinary session of the European Parliament and participation by Javier Solana, the 
High Representative of the European Union, not playing a leading role during the mission in 
Kiev are characteristics for the hesitant attitude of the European Union towards the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine‖
52. Secondly, it is interesting to note that it was during the Orange 
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Revolution that the Action Plan for Ukraine (―negotiated with pre-revolutionary elites‖
53), 
the instrument of the European Neighbourhood Policy, was adopted. As a result, it did not 
take  into  the  consideration  the  changed  political  conditions,  and  as  a  result  lost  the 
opportunity to exploit the new possibilities in democracy promotion in Ukraine.  
 
4. Why Balkans ‘Yes’ and Ukraine ‘No’? 
According to Title V, chapter 1, article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty, ―The Union's action 
on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own 
creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: 
democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  the  universality  and  indivisibility  of  human  rights  and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, 
and  respect  for  the  principles  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  and  international  law‖
54 
(emphasis  added).  If  the  principle  that  inspires  EU  action  on  the  international  scene  is 
enlargement, and if the goal of this action is the spread of democracy, it is important to ask 
why this inspiring principle and overall goal were not taken into the consideration in the case 
of Ukraine. Moreover, it was clearly stated by the European Council of Thessaloniki that the 
―future of [the] Western Balkans is within the European Union‖
55, while attitudes toward 
Ukraine  are  rich  with  ambiguous  declaratory  statements  such  as  the  ―EU  acknowledged 
Ukraine‘s European inspirations and welcomed its European choice‖
56. In the attempt to 
understand  the  reasons  for  the  EU‘s  refusal  of  membership  prospects  for  Ukraine,  a 
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qualitative analysis was conducted through the use of interviews. One of the questions posed 
to interviewees was ―why Balkans ‗yes‘ while Ukraine ‗no‘?‖.   
The  interviewee  from  the  European  Parliament
57  first  pointed out that the main 
reason for ‗Ukraine-no‘ is the enlargement fatigue of the European Union. He said that the 
consideration of democratic values has little to do with the decision of enlargement. This 
shows us that if democracy is a formal requirement of membership, it is far from being its 
guiding principle. The interviewee listed several reasons of why Ukraine is not promised 
membership prospects: the voting in the Council would be affected seriously, as Ukraine is 
the second largest country in Europe and this would cause the shift in the decision-making 
power  in  the  Council;  Ukraine  would  consume  common  agricultural  policy  funds;  and 
divisions  existed  among  Member  States  in  terms  of  political  will.  He  emphasized 
furthermore that geopolitical considerations play an important role, and in this sense the 
Russia factor is a very important one, even if Russia is much more concerned with Ukraine‘s 
membership in NATO.  
The  question,  ―Why  Balkans  ‗yes‘  while  Ukraine  ‗no‘?‖  provoked  interesting 
reactions from interviewees.  It created  a kind of protective reaction on the part of most 
interviewees, especially from those from the European Commission. The interviewee from 
the European Parliament did not demonstrate this attitude and declared that the ―EU feels a 
sense  of  guilt  towards  the  Balkans‖.  He  pointed  out  that  from  the  point  of  view  of 
democratic  achievements,  Ukraine  has  progressed  more  than  many  Western  Balkan 
countries, which confirms his previous statement that enlargement is not about democracy. 
The interviewee expressed a very interesting thought that Ukraine will probably join the EU 
earlier then Albania, a courageous statement that was probably dependent on the fact that the 
European Parliament is favourable towards Ukraine‘s membership.  
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The interviewee from the European Commission (1)
58 was more pessimistic about 
Ukraine‘s  prospect  for  membership.  He  explained  that  the  ―climate  is  not  good  for 
enlargement‖ and admitted that ―already [the enlargement to] Bulgaria and Romania was not 
an ideal choice‖. The interviewee explained that divisions in terms of political will among 
the Member States induced caution about future enlargements, and that it is better to ―keep 
low‖, because any further push can trigger the risk of refusing membership to the Balkans. 
The official also emphasized that Russia is certainly a very important factor, even if ―on 
[the] surface‖ it is not considered to be an ―obstacle‖. The Russia factor, according to the 
interviewee, is always implicit.  The interviewee also pointed out two things: first, Russia 
has a legitimate interest in the region, and second, that Russia is ―ok with Serbia in [the] 
EU‖,  but  difficulties  arise  when  it  comes  to  Ukraine  or  Georgia.  While  explaining  the 
reasons  for  ‗Ukraine-no‘,  he  called  it  ―the  second  Turkey‖,  as  there  is  also  a  huge  gap 
between Turkey‘s expectations and the EU‘s response. Other reasons for the EU‘s refusal to 
promise the membership to  Ukraine included  the distribution of  cohesion  funds  and  the 
common  agricultural  policy.  Regarding  the  question  ―why  Balkans  ‗yes‘  while  Ukraine 
‗no‘?‖, he said that the comparison should be avoided. He also emphasized the security 
dimension and said that the Balkans, as an ―inner garden‖, is of great relevance to EU. This 
demonstrates that the reasoning is always made in terms of the EU‘s needs rather than in 
terms of value considerations. The interviewee underlined that in the Balkans there is more 
progress (which contradicts the position of previous interviewee), and when asked if there is 
more progress in the area of ―democracy‖, the interviewee explained that enlargement is ―not 
only  about  democracy‖.  Then  the  interviewee  elaborated  that  it  is  true  that  democratic 
progress is further reaching in Ukraine than in some other Balkan countries, and he added 
that  the  functioning  of  institutions  in  Ukraine  and  Bosnia  is  hardly  comparable.  While 
discussing the issue if  EU membership  could  have provided  the  necessary consensus  to 
                                                 
58 Brussels, March 2010   19 
consolidate democracy in Ukraine, the interviewee identified it as Ukrainian blackmailing, 
―or take me in, or I am going to collapse‖. The interviewee stated clearly that ―we don‘t want 
to import problems, but assets‖. He also declared that it is not a ―philanthropy business‖ and 
that  realism  is  guiding  EU  decisions  in  regards  to  Ukraine.    While  speaking  about  the 
absorption capacity of EU, he also noted that ―we are not going to grow to China‖.  
The findings from the interviews tested the hypothesis about the limited importance 
of the value of democracy in EU political action. It showed that Realpolitik considerations 
(geopolitics and soft security issues) as well as its interest of self-preservation (conserving 
the status quo in terms of the distribution of funds, voting power in the Council, etc.) largely 
shape the EU foreign policy towards Ukraine.  In conclusion, the very limited ideational 
dimension of EU goals and the prevalence of self-interest and geopolitical considerations 
contradict the widespread perception of EU normative power.  
 
5. European Neighbourhood Policy and the rise of ‘EU prince’ 
The refusal to promise membership prospects to Ukraine was accompanied by the 
elaboration of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which became a framework  for EU-
Ukraine relations.  An exploration of the origins of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
gives a good indication of the goals of this new foreign policy.  
The  Copenhagen  European  Council  in  December  2002  stated  that  the  EU  is 
―determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity 
within and beyond the new borders of the Union‖
59. The goal of avoiding the emergence of a 
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new ―iron curtain‖ 
60  was inscribed in the original formula coined by European Commission 
President Romano Prodi: creating a ―ring of friends‖, who will benefit from ―everything but 
institutions‖
61.  ―Everything  but  institutions‖,  however,  did  not  preclude  a  membership 
perspectives in the initial phase of policy elaboration
62, but this position changed at the next 
stage of the policy elaboration, which was expressed well by  Chris Patten: ―Over the past 
decade,  the  Union‘s  most  successful  foreign  policy  instrument  has  undeniably  been  the 
promise of EU membership. This is not sustainable. For the coming decade, we need to find 
new ways to export the stability, security and prosperity we have created within the enlarged 
Europe‖
63. As a result, the dual goal of this new policy is the exclusion of enlargement and 
the avoidance of new dividing lines. This combination of inclusive and exclusive elements is 
peculiar to the European Neighbourhood Policy.  
The  other  objective  of  this  new  policy  is  the  security  and  stability  of  the  EU‘s 
neighbourhood. The words of ENP Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner are instructive and show 
that stability and security are not just goals but rather necessities, as it ―is not just a matter of 
political imperative, but a matter of self-interest. If Europe did not ‗export‘ stability, it would 
import ‗instability‘‖
64 (emphasis added). These security and stability objectives are the core 
of the new foreign policy: ―ENP is connected more strongly to the anxieties outlined in the 
European Security Strategy and less to the aims of establishing commonality and reform as 
outlined in the 2004 Strategy Paper‖
65. The attempt to create the ―community of security‖
66 
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in  the  EU‘s  neighbourhood  is  a  multidimensional  reform-based  security  project
67  which 
leans on a broad conception of security: it includes the crisis management and resolution of 
‗frozen conflicts‘, as well as security in energy supply, border management, the fight against 
terrorism, organized crime, human and drugs trafficking, illegal immigration, the spread of 
transmittable diseases and money laundering. A safe and stable neighbourhood, or a buffer 
zone which contains the soft security threats and prevents its spread to the EU, is a key 
element in the ENP strategy
68.  A prosperous and well-governed semi-periphery in this sense 
is not so much  an objective in itself but rather the instrument to pursu e the major goal of 
security.  The  self-preservation  objective  is  considered  by  realists  as  the  primary  and 
primordial goal of any political community. From this perspective, the diffusion of norms 
does not reflect the benevolent EU normative power but is a part of the EU‘s interest-driven 
agenda
69.   
An inherent  tension  exists   between  values and  security   in  this  case.  This  is  a 
particularly important observation because ―there is no clear hierarchy between the different 
elements of the ENP strategy‖
70. Even though the role of democracy in the ENP appears to 
be the underpinning value of EU relations with its neighbours, from the priorities listed in 
the ENP Strategy Paper
71 we notice that the values of democracy and human rights are 
ambiguously intertwined with security interests such as  the fight against organized crime, 
terrorism  and  conflict  resolution.  Nicole  Wichmann  goes  further  and  argues  that  the 
promotion of the rule of law , which is considered to be the cornerstone of EU normative 
power, is aimed at buttressing a ―third country‘s capacity to deal with security threats, such 
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as terrorism, organized crime and irregular migration‖
72, and so what could appear as an 
altruistic  EU  goal  of  promoting  democracy  through  embedding  the  rule  of  law  into 
agreements is nothing more than an instrumental use of practices that can assure the desired 
self-interested outcome at best. As Florent Parmentier states, ―the democratization of the 
neighbours  is  supposed  to  help  security  at  home‖
73.  It  is  in  fact  interesting  to  note  the 
quantitative gap between the very word ―democracy‖ and ―security‖ in the Strategy Paper on 
ENP: ―democracy‖ can be found 9 times in the text, while ―security‖ is mentioned 30 times 
in various contexts. The discourse on democracy is vague and broad while the objective of 
security is translated into concrete strategies. Furthermore, the instrument of conditionality 
implied in the Strategy on ENP is defined in such vague terms that ―the link between the 
conditions and rewards under the ENP is virtually absent‖
74. 
 The  analysis  of  the  two  strategy  papers  and  respective  Indicative  Programmes 
identifies these features and trends in EU-Ukraine cooperation. According to the strategy 
papers, democracy as a value is omnipresent in EU-Ukraine relations, but the vagueness of 
the  concept,  which  is  often  merged  with  human  rights  and  economic  reforms,  and  the 
diminishing emphasis on its cross-cutting nature, suggest that it loses its central position. 
The strategy paper 2007-2013
75 lowers the discourse to strategic objectives in specific stages 
and towards particular sectors, especially those that are more directly linked with stability in 
and  the  security  of  the  region.  ‗Soft-security‘  issues  are  clearly  gaining  increasing 
importance  and  centrality.  In  addition  to  this,  the  country  strategy  paper  2007-2013 
represents not only a shift in approach but also in methods. It removes the promotion of 
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democracy objective from the centrality of EU-Ukraine relations and concentrates on the 
specialized instrument, EIDHR.  
Another element that emerged from the analysis is that economic reform is given 
great importance, but the fields in which it should be carried out are those which specifically 
block  EU  trade  interests  in  the  Ukrainian  market,  namely  the  lack  of  transparency, 
credibility,  favourable  investment  environment,  and  Ukrainian  compliance  with  EU 
standards. However, the most interesting trend is the strategy paper 2002-2006
76 in which 
the EU specifically defined its own interests, in contrast to the strategy paper 2007-2013 that 
tries to avoid any reference to particular EU interests. These findings suggest that while the 
strategic interests are increasing in importance, there is a new tendency to disguise them. 
          The analysis of national indicative programmes (2002-2003; 2004-2006; 2007-
2010; 2011-2013) demonstrated how strategy papers are translated in operational terms by 
the  allocation  of  funds  and  by  the  individuation  of  concrete  projects.  It  is  also  a  good 
indicator of priorities and, as a consequence, serves as a double check of identified trends.  
The growing importance of border management and other ‗soft security issues‘ in the 
strategic  papers  corresponds  with  the  indicative  programs:  in  the  indicative  programme 
2002-2003
77 the border management area is provided with the larg est amount of funds (22 
million); the national indicative programme 2004 -2006
78 put ―soft security issues‖
79at the 
very centre of the intervention, demonstrated by the shift in the allocation of funds which 
implied an extraordinary growth of funds in the area of border management (from 22 to 60 
million euros). The latter remained the most important area of financial intervention, but the 
gap  between  this  and  other  areas  increased  significantly  (while  in  previous  indicative 
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programmes the discrepancy between the first and second most important interventions was 
of 1 million, now the gap is of 35 million euros). Furthermore, in this indicative programme 
the  imbalance  between  the  aim  of  facilitating  the  persons‘  movement  and  the  goal  of 
controlling the borders and preventing the spread of threats is clearly manifest. The focus  
here  is  almost  entirely  on  ―combating  organized  crime,  drugs,  terrorism,  trafficking  in 
human beings‖
80 as well as on illegal immigration and money laundering. The predominance 
of  EU  self-interest  is  visible  also  in  other  areas  of  intervention,  as  investment  in 
infrastructure  (to  create  an  easy  communication  channel  through  Ukraine  towards  South 
Caucasus), in local development (to support areas of particular EU interest in security or 
geopolitical  strategy),  in  economic  development  (to  create  a  secure  environment  for 
European private investments) or in the security of the energy supply, which is another very 
sensitive issue for EU in its relations with Ukraine and was often remarked upon by the 
interviewed officials. 
It is also important to note, that while the indicative programme 2002-2003 included 
explicit conditionality in the text and mentioned the respect of democratic principles and 
human rights as basis for continuation of EU assistance, this conditionality paragraph was 
removed  in  the  indicative  program  2004-2006  and  continued  to  be  absent  in  the  two 
subsequent indicative programs.  
The national indicative programme 2011-2013
81 reflects the modified approach (now 
sector-based) and the new programming cycle  presented in the strategy paper 2007 -2013. 
The word ‗democracy‘ is completely absent in the text, and the most interesting fact is that 
under the label ―Good Governance and Rule of Law‖, one does not find any reference to 
democracy, civil society, or media independence. In line with the new approach and new 
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programming  cycle,  the  initiatives  in  promoting  the  development  of  civil  society,  an 
independent  media  and  others  fields  more  directly  linked  to  democracy,  are  completely 
removed  and  placed  under  the  EIDHR.  Particularly  interesting  is  that  this  indicative 
programme differs from all others in that it contains an extensive series of annexes, the 
largest of which is entitled, ―Ukraine. Country Migration Profile‖ and encompasses 9 pages 
(42-51).  In  fact,  here  we  find  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  number  of  emigrants, 
remittances, migration to the EU, illegal immigration and migration routes through Ukraine 
to  the  EU.  It  is  stated  that  Ukraine  is  ―on  a  major  Central  European  route  of  irregular 
migration, including several  channels  of illegal  movements  of persons‖
82. The particular 
attention given to the migration profile also reflects which fields the EU prioritizes in terms 
of research and thus should be considered to be of key relevance. 
In-depth discourse analysis and examination of the concrete EU programmes showed 
a clear tendency: the EU is increasingly attempting to ensure its own interests in its relations 
with Ukraine. The ‗soft security‘, economic, energy supply and geopolitical interests are 
prevailing in the EU‘s considerations towards Ukraine. The democracy objective is always 
present, but surely it is not a key objective of EU co-operation with Ukraine. The vague 
definition of democracy which keeps a high tone on a rhetorical level but is poorly translated 
into concrete programmes, as well as the ambiguous or even weak conditionality contained 
therein are good indicators of its minor importance vis-à-vis the strategic interests of the EU. 
The growing strategic interests are well reflected in the elaboration of a new programming 
cycle and new strategies. But the definition of these interests is increasingly avoided and 
overshadowed by the high rhetorical tones. The EU in this context appears as an emerging 
‗new prince‘ that tries to create a perfect image of himself and of his ventures.  
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6. Conclusions 
This paper, through the case study of EU foreign policy goals towards Ukraine, tried 
to  analyse if EU political  action is  shaped by  value considerations,  namely the ideal  of 
democracy,  or  whether  self-interests  (geopolitical,  geostrategic,  economic  or  security) 
prevail in framing EU political action towards Ukraine. The hypothesis that, beyond the rich 
rhetorical  discourse  on  democracy,  the  European  Union  is  primarily  driven  by  its  own 
interests (geopolitical, geostrategic, economic and security), and that democracy, far from 
being a guiding value but rather an instrumental dimension of the EU self-interest to create 
stability in its neighbourhood, was tested in several steps.   
The first part of the paper analysed the underlying motivations of the EU‘s modest 
responses to Ukraine‘s attempts at democracy. The story of EU-Ukraine relations is a ‗story 
of lost opportunities‘ for the EU to strengthen democracy in Ukraine. In particular during the 
Orange Revolution of 2004, which was a victory not only for Ukraine‘s democracy, but also 
for  the  EU  as  it  represented  Ukraine‘s  European  choice,  the  EU  was  perceived  as  a 
consolidating  factor  both  within  Ukrainian  society  as  well  as  among  the  major  political 
forces. This ‗glue effect‘ was an historical opportunity for the EU to strengthen Ukraine‘s 
budding democracy. However, due to its limited response, the EU failed to play this role, 
and the aftermath of the Orange Revolution saw the breakdown of the internal consensus of 
Ukrainian democracy, which is beset now by continuous political crisis and Ukraine‘s recent 
turn towards Russia. Through historical analysis and interviews, one could identify that the 
reluctant and ambiguous EU approach towards Ukraine is far from being inspired by value 
considerations. The geopolitical interests of the Russia-first approach, as well as the interest   27 
of  self-preservation  (the  preservation  of  status  quo)  determined  EU  political  decisions 
towards Ukraine. 
The  second  part  of  the  paper  demonstrated  that  the  concept  of  the  New 
Neighbourhood Policy is also a self-interested initiative, which seeks to promote stability 
and  security  rather  than  ideals  or  values  in  the  EU  neighbourhood.  The  high  tone  on 
democracy as a constitutive value of EU external action is contradicted by the predominance 
of  other  interests,  specifically  geopolitical,  economic  and  ‗soft  security‘  concerns.  This 
demonstrated that EU power is not so much normative but rather contains strong elements of 
Realpolitik. 
 From  the  discourse  and  content  analysis  it  is  clear  that  the  Realpolitik  features, 
namely the interest of self-preservation  and geopolitical considerations, are becoming more 
and more important in the EU‘s definition of its relations with Ukraine, while the role of 
democracy  has  significantly  decreased,  especially  after  the  Orange  Revolution  and  the 
Eastern  enlargement.  The  combined  effect  of  diminishing  concerns  about  Ukraine‘s 
democratic performance and of the increasing importance of ‗soft security threats‘, however, 
is not so visible in the official documents. The tendency to keep a high tone in the rhetoric 
on democracy and the growing avoidance to make EU interests transparent shows that the 
EU, to a certain extent, resembles the Machiavellian prince who has to disguise its interests 
and to give a great image of himself and of his virtuous ventures.   
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